by Douglas B Stevenson, Esq., Director, Center for Seafarers’ Rights, Seamen’s Church Institute of New York & New Jersey

Thank you for inviting me to speak with you. It is a real pleasure for me to be with you in Texas.

Last week, when I was doing some research on Texas attractions, preparing myself for this trip, I discovered that the word “biggest” is often associated with things in Texas. For example, I learned that the biggest dog training institution in the world is the “Dog School” at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio. Apparently the school is getting even bigger because of the increased demand for security dogs to work at, among other places, our seaports. While I was thinking about dogs on ships, I was immediately reminded of the extraordinary efforts to rescue the Indonesian terrier, Forgea, from an abandoned tanker in the Pacific last April (unnoticed by the press was the two dead crewmen who were also on the tanker).

It’s wonderful that we can rely on dogs to help us secure our vessels and ports and to make sure that vessels get rescued. Dogs do have some limitations, however. What we really need is to rely upon people to protect our ports and vessels. More specifically, we need ship’s crews to help us keep our ships and seaports safe and secure.

My intent, in speaking to you this morning, is to point out that merchant mariners are essential allies in our war on terror, but that the way that we treat seafarers is making them increasingly disgruntled and is counter-productive to maritime security. We need to change our attitudes towards merchant mariners.

Almost every day we read fact and fiction about how vulnerable our seaports are to terrorist attacks and how seaports can be used to bring terrorists and weapons of mass destruction into the United States. At the same time we know for fact that our economy depends upon the uninterrupted flow of goods through our seaports.

We must therefore employ reasonable measures to protect vessels and seaports in a way that does not unreasonably restrict the flow of commerce. This is a very difficult and complex task. It is a job that will require intelligent policies, vigilance and cooperation between government and industry – including merchant mariners.

We have relied on ships crews in the past and we are going to need their help even more in the future. American and foreign mariners have proven themselves in Desert Shield, Desert Storm, on 9/11, and in our current operations.

I know from my own experience of visiting ships at seafarers’ centers around the United States that seafarers love visiting the United States and they love American people. I am deeply concerned that if we Americans keep treating mariners as we are now, we are going to lose their friendship and their cooperation.

Since 9/11 we Americans have not adequately recognized that merchant mariners are potential victims of terrorism and allies in our war on terrorism. Rather we have been treating seafarers as if they were potential terrorists themselves.

This attitude seems to permeate many of the public and private policies that affect seafarers. One example of the attitude is denying merchant mariners shore leave.

We, at the Center for Seafarers Rights, have for many years dealt with shore leave restrictions. This has primarily been a problem in the United States, because the United States is one of the few countries in the world that require ships’ crews to have visas before they can go on shore leave. When we look back at the shore leave issues from before 9/11, they appear nostalgically quaint. Back then; we tried to convince the authorities to abolish crew visas, or at least to bend the immigration rules. The prospect of eliminating D visas actually began being considered, rules were bent and visa waivers were common.

On September 11, 2001 everything changed.

Within moments of the attack on the World Trade Center, the ports of New York and New Jersey were sealed. All tunnels and bridges from Manhattan were closed. The only escape for hundreds of thousands of workers in lower Manhattan was by watercraft. The unsung heroes of that terrible Tuesday morning were the brave men and women seafarers who operated more than one hundred vessels through smoke and debris to evacuate almost one million people from Manhattan.

From Tuesday, September 11 until Friday, September 14, no ships were allowed to enter New York harbor. Some ships, especially those with dangerous cargos, were ordered to leave the harbor. No crewmembers, foreign or American, were allowed to leave their ships. By Friday, the harbor was gradually reopened to merchant traffic after each ship was boarded and inspected by the Coast Guard before it could enter the harbor. Shore leave, however, was still prohibited. Ships were required to provide 96 hours advance notice of arrival to the Coast Guard. Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration, and other law enforcement officers maintained high visibility and security in the seaports. This status continued for about a month. Some crews started getting shore leave again in October, but policies seemed to change on a case-by-case basis. Similar restrictions were imposed in ports throughout the United States.

As you might imagine, tension ran very high during the month following 9/11. It was, however, also a time in which people came together in a way that many had never experienced. One senior Coast Guard officer, who had been in the middle of the 9/11 security operations in New York harbor, told me that he was amazed at how positive, cooperative and supportive that all seafarers, both foreign and American, had been to the inspections and restrictions. The crews also felt threatened by terrorists, and they appreciated the efforts to ensure safety and security.

Early in October 2001 the Coast Guard promulgated nationwide maritime security regulations, including the 96-hour advance notice of arrivals. In addition to the national measures, the regulations authorized Coast Guard Captains of the Port to employ any additional restrictions to ensure security at their particular ports. Terminal operators had to create security plans for their terminals. Some private terminals, especially tank terminals, imposed their own restrictions on shore leave. The rules also placed restrictions on all persons’, including port chaplains, access to terminals and vessels

As the mood evolved from immediate crisis response to maintaining security over the long term, it appeared to me that the highest priority on every governmental agency’s agenda was to make sure that no terrorist entered the United States – and especially that no terrorist should make it through a hole in their security. This resulted in strict scrutiny of documents and strict enforcement of regulations. Counterfeit visas and merchant mariners documents were identified. Some seafarers were criminally prosecuted for providing inaccurate information on official documents. The Immigration Service strictly enforced immigration rules, and waiver authority returned to district directors from individual immigration officers who had previously held discretionary powers.

Last April, there was an incident in Norfolk, Virginia where four Pakistani seafarers jumped ship after receiving visa waivers from an Immigration Officer. The incident was widely and inaccurately reported by the national media claiming that some terrorists posing as seafarers had slipped into the United States. The ship-jumpers, like most illegal migrants to the United States, had jumped ship for economic reasons. They were not terrorists. They were trying to become Americans and live the American dream.

Unfortunately, the Norfolk incident generated some public perception about seafarers, and it was negative.

The Immigration officer was disciplined; Immigration Service revoked shore leave for the ship; and immigration controls tightened at seaports. Visa waivers have been rare since then. The Immigration Service even began limiting paroles for medical care to “life or death” emergencies. The immigration service began denying shore leave to ships’ crews when stowaways are found on their vessels. Seafarers who have completed their contracts could not be repatriated from the United States unless they had a “C” visa. In addition, as a result of the Norfolk incident, and as some members of this association have already noticed, the Coast Guard began ordering shipowners to place security guards on ships in instances where the Immigration Service denied shore leave.

Since then, shore leave has been available, but with restrictions and with different criteria in different ports. From our data, there is no inconsistency throughout the United States for the most common reason for denying shore leave: no visas. If a seafarer does not have a visa, he or she can expect INS to detain them while in the United States.

For a long time before 9/11, I had been pressing the United States to conform with the IMO Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic Convention which states that crewmembers shall not be required to hold a visa for the purpose of shore leave. In 2000 and 2001 we actually began to see some progress. However, since 9/11 the political climate has not been very hospitable for easing any visa requirements. If anything, visa requirements are getting stricter. For example, on May 14, 2002, President Bush signed into US law the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. This law is intended to make the United States borders more secure by, among other things, requiring every foreign visitor entering the United States to carry a travel document containing biometric identification. It also requires machine readable, tamper-resistant visas that use biometric identifiers, and it calls for all commercial vessels entering the United States to provide crew and passenger lists to the Immigration Service before arrival.

The United States Congress is very concerned about maritime security. They are acutely aware that they must strike a balance between maintaining the efficient flow of international shipping and on protecting seaports from terrorist attacks. The “Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002" (S.1214), enacted last Thursday, contains requirements for security plans, ship’s security officers, transportation security cards for seafarers and port workers, as well as creating international seafarers’ identity cards.

In addition to domestic anti-terrorist legislation, the United States has initiated comprehensive proposals for international security standards. For example, during the past year, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has worked on more than seventy proposals intended to enhance ship and port security and to avert shipping from becoming a target of international terrorism. The IMO expects to adopt new international security standards (the ISPS Code) at a Conference on Maritime Security this December.

One of the proposals made by the United States to the IMO related to developing standards for an international seafarers’ identity document. The IMO sent this proposal to the International Labor Organization (ILO), because the ILO already has a convention on this topic: the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (ILO-108). The ILO took immediate action and placed procedures leading to amendments to the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention on a fast track. The ILO has held consultations with experts and governments. ILO has also circulated a questionnaire to governments. The ILO plans to adopt a Protocol to the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention next June.

United States governmental agencies, particularly the United States Coast Guard, have actively sought an agreement on international standards at both the IMO and ILO. The big question is whether the international standards that are ultimately produced will satisfy the United States Congress. The Maritime Transportation Act of 2002 gives the international community 24 months to come up with an acceptable identification card system. If they don’t the United States will unilaterally create its own identification card system for foreign crews, apparently in addition to the existing visa requirements.

From all of the legislation and international conventions that have been proposed or adopted, I don’t foresee much improvement in seafarers’ quality of life unless some course changes are made. The Maritime Transportation Act of 2002 and the ISPS Code will place significant security functions on ship’s crews. Seafarers will have to get multiple seafarers identity documents. Meanwhile, they are still being denied shore leave and shipowners still have to pay for guards to keep detained crew on their vessels. Of course, the unanswered question is: how can expect ship’s crews to help protect security on their vessels when in our ports when we don’t trust them even to go to the dock to make a phone call home?

It would be very easy to put all of the blame on the Immigration and Naturalization Service. To do so would be wrong. In reality, we complain about the INS because they are diligent in performing the duties Congress gave them. When INS has exercised some discretion, they have gotten into trouble: they are accused of inconsistency; they are disciplined for giving visa waivers to Pakistanis in Norfolk. You can’t blame the INS in this environment for taking the safe course of strictly enforcing existing statutes. The real source of the problem is the law that they are expected to enforce. We hear everyday that the world has changed since 9/11. We need new tools to respond to the new threats. Clearly, our reliance on visas did not protect us on 9/11. Instead of trying to defend a system that has shown to be inadequate, we need to keep our minds open to new ideas that provide reasonable levels of security without unduly burdening crews. Our system of crew visas, for example, needs to be overhauled. There should be flexibility for INS to accept seafarers’ identity cards that meet international standards as a substitute for a crew visa.

I know that comparisons between the aviation and maritime industries are not popular with some in the maritime industry. Both commercial aircrews and merchant vessel crews are required to have the same D-1 visa. But, aircrews are treated much differently from ship crews at their respective ports of entry. Aircrews are given special immigration lines and other special treatment. I don’t think that the reason for this is that the INS likes aviators more than they like mariners. I believe the difference lies in the way that the aviation industry supports and encourages their crews. The costs of setting up special immigration lines for aircrews and for establishing reliable identification systems were aviation industry initiatives.

The INS is not responsible for all crew detentions in United States ports. Several tank terminals in the United States do not allow any crew, foreign or domestic, to go ashore from their vessels moored in their terminals. In addition, chaplains and crew relatives are not allowed to visit the ships. This is a serious problem for crews on very vulnerable tank vessels. The security concerns of the terminals could, it seems to me, be easily addressed in other ways, for example by providing van service between the ship and the main gate.

Terminals and charters expend a lot of effort in vetting ships for safety. If they were to put the same attention in vetting the crews on the ships, instead of simply detaining them, they could greatly increase security and also improve crew performance and retention.

Shipowners have rightfully complained about having to pay for guard services to keep their detained crews on board. They have taken the position that since the guards protect the ports, the ports should pay for the guards. I suggest that rather than debating who should pay for the guards, shipowners should be saying: “we know our crews, we trust them, they shouldn’t be detained on our ships and they certainly don’t need to be guarded”. The shipping industry must reevaluate its reliance on hiring halls and manning agencies for hiring crews. Ship owners and seafarers have much to gain from developing long-term employment relationships. Security will also benefit.

From the data that we have collected from seafarers’ centers around the United States, we can support the notion that guards are unwarranted in most of the cases. Almost all of the detentions that have been reported to me have been for the simple reason that crew did not possess visas. There was no evidence that crew were security threats. Both shore leave denials and guard service expenses are directly related to problems with our visa system.

We need to raise seafarers’ status by developing a way to identify them as the professionals that they are. In this regard, the proposals for establishing international standards for seafarers’ identity cards hold a lot of promise. I think that providing for a reliable, positively verifiable and internationally acceptable identification card for professional seafarers will go a long way towards protecting maritime security and raising seafarers' status. The seafarers' identification card should be accepted as a substitute for visas in those countries that require them for shore leave.

We don’t need visas to protect security or to keep undesirable people from entering the United States. Almost every country in the world protects its borders without requiring crew visas. As long as we have an international identification card system, that complies with United States statutory requirements, such as biometric data, which can assure us that the person holding the card is that same person, the authorities can easily determine from their data whether to admit the person. Crew lists are already being given more scrutiny as part of the 96-hour pre-arrival notice requirements than they get in the visa application process. We even have the technology check out an individual instantly with a smart card and a palm-pilot.

We have the technology to identify professional seafarers and to recognize their value to our economy and our security. All we need is political will and industry support. Taking good care of ship’s crews and maximizing their shore leave opportunities is in our national interest, makes good business sense and, obviously, is good for mariners. Our current restrictive policy against crews is bad for mariners, jeopardizes our security and increases ship-operating expenses. We need to change our course and change it now.